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I.

INTRODUCTION

I

n the past few years, the applicability of existing international law to cyberspace has received widespread and growing support among States. It has
been recognized by individual governments as well as in the 2013 1 and 2015 2
reports by the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) on information and communications technologies (ICTs), both of
which were endorsed by the UN General Assembly by consensus. 3 More
recently, the Final Substantive Report of the UN open-ended working group
on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the
context of international security (OEWG), also adopted by consensus
among all UN member States, “reaffirmed that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security and stability in the ICT environment.” 4 A similar statement is found in the latest GGE report, adopted in May 2021. 5
In particular, there is agreement that “sovereignty and international
norms and principles that flow from sovereignty,” as well as “[e]xisting obligations under international law” more generally, apply to States’ ICT-related activities and their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory. 6 Likewise, States have explicitly endorsed the applicability of the UN

1. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 19, U.N.
Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter U.N. GGE Report 2013].
2. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶¶ 24, 28(a),
U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. GGE Report 2015].
3. G.A. Res. 70/237, ¶¶ 1–2(a) (Dec. 30, 2015).
4. Final Substantive Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,
¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2 (Mar. 10, 2021) [hereinafter OEWG Final Substantive Report].
5. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State
Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc.
A/76/135 (July 14, 2021) [hereinafter U.N. GGE Report 2021].
6. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 20; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2, ¶
27; U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶ 71(b).
5
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Charter in its entirety, along with fundamental principles such as dispute settlement by peaceful means and non-intervention. 7 States have also recognized that they must respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and that international humanitarian law applies in armed conflict, including, where applicable, the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction. 8 More generally, they have committed “to meet[ing]
their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them under international law,” 9 as well as to not using proxies
to commit such acts. 10
However, the full extent to which international law applies to ICTs was
not spelled out in the 2013, 2015, and 2021 GGE reports, nor in the OEWG
Final Substantive Report. This uncertainty has led some States and scholars
to question the applicability to “cyberspace” of certain established rules of
international law. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) has opposed the
applicability to cyberspace and digital infrastructure of the rule protecting
(territorial) sovereignty against certain unauthorized intrusions. 11 Similarly,
the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to ICTs has been

7. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 20; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2,
¶¶ 25–28; U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶¶ 70, 71(a), 71(e).
8. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 21; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2,
¶¶ 26, 28(b), 28(d); U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶¶ 70, 71(f).
9. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 23; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2, ¶
28(f); U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶ 71(g).
10. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 23; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2,
¶ 28(e); U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶ 71(g).
11. U.K. Mission to the United Nations, U.K. Statement on the Application of International Law To States’ Conduct In Cyberspace, ¶ 10 (June 3, 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/990851/
application-of-international-law-to-states-conduct-in-cyberspace-uk-statement.pdf; Jeremy
Wright, U.K. Attorney General, Speech at the Chatham House Royal Institute for International affairs: Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century.
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questioned by States such as Russia 12 and China, 13 on the grounds that it
could further militarize cyberspace. Furthermore, an obligation to exercise
due diligence in not allowing ICTs within a State’s territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States has been
explicitly rejected by Argentina, 14 Israel, 15 and the UK, 16 and seriously questioned by New Zealand. 17 To compound such uncertainty, a majority of
States have not yet expressed their views about the application of international law in cyberspace.
Arguments that deny the applicability of certain rules or principles of
international law to cyberspace usually rest on two assumptions.
First, it is often said that cyberspace is a new and inherently different
“space,” “field,” or “domain” of State activity. On this view, the “cyber domain” requires specifically tailored rules or principles of international law

12. Russian Federation, Commentary on the Initial “Pre-Draft” of the Final Report of
the United Nations Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2 (May 22, 2020,
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/russian-commentary-on-owegzero-draft-report-eng.pdf.
13. Yao Shaojun, Minister-Counsellor for the People’s Republic of China, Statement at
U.N. Security Council Arria Formula Meeting on Cyber Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/hyyfy/t1809700.htm; Wu
Jianjian, Counsellor for the People’s Republic of China, Statement at U.N. Security Council
Arria Formula Meeting on Cyber Stability, Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building (May
22, 2020), https://vm.ee/en/activities-objectives/estonia-united-nations/signature-eventestonias-unsc-presidency-cyber (comments at timestamp 1:21:00).
14. Argentina, Intervención de la República Argentina 2° Reunión sustantiva GTCA
sobre los progresos de la informática y las telecomunicaciones en el contexto de la seguridad
internacional (Feb. 11, 2020), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k18/k18w6jq6eg (comments
at timestamp 2:15:00).
15. Roy Schondorf, Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/israels-perspective-on-key-legal-and-practical-issues-concerningthe-application-of-international-law-to-cyber-operations/.
16. U.K. Statement, supra note 11, ¶ 12.
17. New Zealand Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace, ¶¶ 16–17 (Dec. 1, 2020) (on file with authors).
See also Michael Schmitt, New Zealand Pushes the Dialogue on International Cyber Law Forward,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73742/new-zealand-pushesthe-dialogue-on-international-cyber-law-forward/.
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and possibly a new binding legal instrument. 18 On this view, existing international law could only apply in cyberspace if substantiated by sufficient evidence of domain-specific State practice and opinio juris. 19 The search for
cyber-specific practice and opinio juris is usually backed by calls for more national statements on how international law applies to cyber operations. A
more nuanced and sophisticated version of this argument is to be found in
the statement by Israel’s Deputy Attorney General on the application of international law to cyber operations, where he stated that:
It cannot be automatically presumed that a customary rule applicable
in any of the physical domains is also applicable to the cyber domain. The
key question in identifying State practice is whether the practice which
arose in other domains is closely related to the activity envisaged in the
cyber domain. Additionally, it must be ascertained that the opinio juris which
gave rise to the customary rules applicable in other domains was not domain-specific. Given the unique characteristics of the cyber domain, such
an analysis is to be made with particular prudence, as it is very often the
case that relevant differences exist.20

Secondly, the fact that certain standards of conduct have been framed,
in the 2015 UN GGE Report, as “voluntary, non-binding, norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace,” is taken to mean that the behavior in
question is not required by international law. For instance, this has been the
case with the concept of due diligence, which seems to be reflected in the
UN GGE reports in hortatory terms: “States should not knowingly allow their
territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs” or “should
seek to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit
such acts.” 21 For some, the implication of labeling a standard of conduct as
a “voluntary, non-binding, norm,” or framing it as something that States
“should” endeavor to achieve, is that the corresponding rules or principles

18. See Conference Room Paper of the Open-ended Working Group on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Chair’s Summary, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.3* (Mar. 10, 2021),
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Chairs-Summary-A-AC.290-202
1-CRP.3-technical-reissue.pdf (calling for such a new instrument).
19. See, e.g., U.K. Statement, supra note 11, ¶¶ 10, 12.
20. Schondorf, supra note 15.
21. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 23; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2,
¶ 13(c).
8

Drawing the Cyber Baseline

Vol. 99

have not yet developed or crystallized for cyberspace, or that this domain
has been carved out from the scope of said obligations. 22
Again, a good example of this line of thinking comes from the statement
of Israel’s Deputy Attorney General:
There was wisdom in mentioning [due diligence] in the chapter covering norms of responsible State behavior, as it does not, at this point in time,
translate into a binding rule of international law in the cyber context. . . .
The inherent different features of cyberspace—its decentralization and
private characteristics—incentivize cooperation between States on a voluntary basis, such as with the case of national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). . . . However, we have not seen widespread State
practice beyond this type of voluntary cooperation, and certainly not practice grounded in some overarching opinio juris, which would be indispensable for a customary rule of due diligence, or something similar to that, to
form. 23

In this article, we challenge those assumptions and conclude that all relevant existing rules of international law are by default applicable to the conduct of States with respect to ICTs. Such conclusion is based on five arguments, which will be developed in turn.
Part 2 starts by warning that the terminology of “domains” for the application of international law may be misguided. In fact, international law is
not as a general matter domain-specific, and thus its applicability to a specific
domain (traditionally, land, sea, air, and outer space) need not be specifically
proven. Quite the contrary: any limitation imposed on the scope of general
international law, whether framed around a subject matter, context, area,
type of activity, or domain, cannot be assumed but must be drawn from
specific evidence.
Next, Part 3 delves into the notion of “domain” and its development in
the context of IHL. We demonstrate that, in this and other areas, the concept
was never meant to function as a tool to carve out certain types of activity
from existing rules or principles of international law. This in turn means that
rules of international law, whether conventional or customary, which evince
a general scope of application, can be interpreted and applied to new domains.

22. See, e.g., U.K. Statement, supra note 11, ¶ 12.
23. Schondorf, supra note 15.
9
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Part 4 then considers that, in any event, cyberspace is not per se a “space”
or a singular domain, at least not in the sense that air, sea, or outer space are.
Instead, it may be defined as an interactive medium—comprised of digital
networks and technologies spread across national borders and made up of
physical, logical, and personal elements—which is used to communicate,
store, or modify information.
In this light, Part 5 explains that international law is technology-neutral
in the sense that it applies to all technologies through which States and nonState actors operate, whether these are old or new, analog or digital, physical
or virtual.
Lastly, Part 6 contends that the fact that a certain behavior has been the
subject of a policy recommendation—like the so-called “voluntary norms of
responsible state behavior in cyberspace”—by no means implies that the
same behavior is not required as a matter of international law. Quite the opposite: political statements cannot deprive international obligations of their
binding force but may be seen as reinforcing and complementing them.
The article concludes by acknowledging that international law can be rewritten, including for States’ use of ICTs. However, any law-making effort
in this respect is not built on a legal vacuum but on a wealth of existing rules
which already apply to those technologies.
II.

THE “GENERALITY” OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

That general international law is, by definition, general is self-evident. But that
does not tell us much about its extent or scope of application, that is, who is
bound by general international law and to what matters it applies. For this
reason, it is important to understand the different ways in which international law can be said to “apply generally,” and, in particular, the extent to
which this generality includes different subject matters, contexts, areas, or
types of activity, including the use of ICTs.
First and foremost, “general international law” refers to international
rules and principles that bind all States as a matter of customary international
law, general principles of law, or universally ratified treaties. 24 Examples include the principles of sovereign equality of States and non-intervention, as
24. See Josef L. Kunz, General International Law and the Law of International Organizations,
47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 456, 456–457 (1953); Anastasios Gourgourinis, General/Particular International Law and Primary/Secondary Rules: Unitary Terminology of
a Fragmented System, 22 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 993, 1004–7 (2011);
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well as the UN Charter and its prohibition on the use of force, binding under
conventional and customary international law. 25 Among those rules and
principles generally applicable to all States, some deal with more specific
matters than others. For instance, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions have
been universally ratified and crystallized into customary international law,
thereby applying to all States. 26 Yet their subject matter is limited to regulating the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict, that is, to the so-called
“field” of IHL. 27 Likewise, the principle of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other States only covers coercive interference within another
State’s domaine reservé, that is, public or private matters over which the State
possesses exclusive authority to regulate. 28 In fact, apart from a handful of
very general and foundational principles of international law from which
States’ obligations seem to flow, such as sovereignty and pacta sunt servanda,
international rules and principles tend to have a more or less defined subject
matter.
In some instances, treaty texts or State practice and/or opinio juris indicate
explicitly or implicitly that the application of an international rule or principle
is limited to a particular context, area, or specific type of activity. For instance, this is the case with the centuries-old obligation of States to respect
freedom of navigation in the high seas, where the practice and opinio juris

International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law, ¶ 493, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
25. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
26. See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (1987).
27. See common article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
28. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, princ. (c) (Oct. 24, 1970). See also TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, cmt. to
r. 4, ¶ 22 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017). But see Harriet Moynihan, The Application of
International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention ¶¶ 105–107, CHATHAM
HOUSE RESEARCH PAPER (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-state-cyberattacks/3-application-non-intervention-principle (advancing a broader scope for the principle).
11
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clearly evince that the rule is restricted to the high seas. 29 The rule does not
guarantee freedom of navigation throughout the seas, nor does it oblige
States to guarantee freedom of movement in other maritime zones, such as
States’ territorial waters or their exclusive economic zones. 30 Similarly, the
obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment, although binding under customary international law, only applies to those activities that
may cause physical harm to the natural environment. 31
Nevertheless, in the absence of a limitation to a particular subject-matter,
context, area, or type of activity, or where the existing expression of a rule is
general (whether its text, or formative opinio juris and State practice), there is
nothing in international law that suggests that one must seek to ascertain
whether a rule applies across domains, as many have sought to characterize
cyberspace or ICTs. For example, it is prohibited for States to arrest the
serving head of another State. It matters not where or how the arrest takes
place. To take another example, in the course of an armed conflict, it is prohibited for States to direct attacks against civilians. Again, it matters not
where the civilians (or the attackers) are or what weapons are used. The same
is true of the law relating to the use of force. It is prohibited to use force
against another State and no inquiry needs be made about the domain in
which a State using force is acting. These, and many other examples, show
that we should be skeptical about a supposition that the application of international law rules is domain-specific.
The bottom line is that to ascertain the scope of application of general
international law, each rule or principle must be assessed on its own terms.
Thus, whether a limitation is based or framed around a subject matter, a
29. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397; HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS; OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 28 (Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1609); Albert J. Hoffmann, Freedom of Navigation,
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 1–6 (last updated Apr.
2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231
690-e1199; Douglas Guilfoyle, The High Seas, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA 204, 207 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 2015).
30. Hoffmann, supra note 29, ¶ 6.
31. See Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20); Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan
River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16); Astrid Epiney,
Environmental Impact Assessment, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶¶ 1–4 (last updated Jan. 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/978
0199231690/law-9780199231690-e1581.
12
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context, an area, a type of activity, a domain, or any other category we might
conceive of, it must be somehow indicated in the rule or principle in question. Importantly, to undertake this assessment, traditional methods of interpretation of treaties or customary international law must be resorted to. These
methods tell us that where a rule is not limited to a certain area, context, type
of activity, or domain, such limitations cannot be read into its scope of application.
III.

THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF A “DOMAIN” IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

It is often assumed that, unlike the physical domains of air, land, sea, and
outer space, cyberspace is an inherently different, virtual domain, where activities may take place without meaningful physical manifestations. But while
belonging to one domain or another is thought to be decisive as to the applicability of international law to a certain activity, the actual meaning and
function of the concept have been largely overlooked.
In common parlance, “domain” has a variety of meanings in different
contexts. More traditionally, the word has been associated with “a territory
over which dominion is exercised” or a “region distinctively marked by some
physical feature.” 32 However, a domain may also refer to a “sphere of
knowledge, influence, or activity,” 33 “a particular interest, activity, or type of
knowledge” 34 or “an area of interest or an area over which a person has control.” 35 Indeed, the so-called “domains of public international law” seem to
refer to the different branches of this legal system and their corresponding
academic fields. 36 And these might cover one, more, or all physical spaces,
depending on the rule or set of rules in question. For example, international
environmental law, a field of international law and academic study, applies
to land, sea, and airspace.
The idea that international law applies to or corresponds to different domains, whether these are areas of knowledge or physical spaces, seems to be
32. Domain, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domain (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
33. Id.
34. Domain, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/
english/domain (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
35. Id.
36. International Law, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/international_law (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
13
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derived from the context of armed conflict. There, the concept “serves as a
fundamental organizing idea, reflecting the way we conceptualize the battlefield and categorize actions taking place during armed conflict.” 37 Importantly, even in this context, categorizing a certain activity as falling within
this or that domain, such as land, sea, air, or other types of battlefield or
warfare, does not exclude or carve out activity in the given domain from the
scope of application of generally applicable rules of IHL. To be sure, some
rules of IHL are specifically designed for application to particular areas, for
example, the First Geneva Convention of 1949 applies to wounded and sick
in armies on land, while the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 applies to
the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea. However, “much of IHL is not
domain-specific and applies generally.” 38 This means that many rules of IHL
apply regardless of whether the act in question takes place on land, the sea,
in the air, or any other space for that matter, and irrespective of other specific
features of the battlefield or act of warfare. This is true of much of the rules
regarding the protection of civilians and the regulation of means and methods of warfare to be found in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and in customary international law.
In sum, the application of rules of international law will sometimes depend on the physical space in which the relevant activity takes place. However, it should not be assumed that a rule first developed in the context of a
particular physical space or domain only applies there, especially when there
is nothing implicit or explicit in the rule or principle in question to suggest
this. Instead, each rule of international law, general or specific, must be interpreted on its own terms and applied to all persons, objects, or events that
fall within its scope.
Indeed, legal interpretation is the most intuitive way to ascertain the
scope of a certain rule or principle of conventional or customary international law and any potential limitation thereto. That treaties must be inter-

37. Sarah McCosker, Domains of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HU77, 97 (Ben Saul & Dapo Akande eds., 2020).
38. Id. at 78.

MANITARIAN LAW
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preted in accordance with their text, context, and object and purpose is beyond doubt. 39 But much controversy surrounds the interpretability of unwritten rules of international law, including custom and general principles. 40
In what follows, we explain why, in the absence of specific limitations, both
written and unwritten rules of international law of general scope are susceptible
to identification and/or interpretation, as well application, in the cyber context, that is, to ICTs. 41 In particular, we tackle the controversial question of
whether it is necessary to prove specific State practice and opinio juris for
existing rules of international law to apply in cyberspace.
While the interpretability of customary international law is beyond the
scope of this article, it suffices to note that, no matter how international lawyers frame the process or methodology for ascertaining the existence, content, and scope of customary international law, there is always room for interpretation in every step of the way. 42 This is because interpretation, understood here as the process of assigning meaning to subjects, objects, or events,
is inherent to human cognition. Simply put, it is by assimilating specific
things to abstract concepts that we understand and communicate about the
world around us. 43 And in this process of “framing,” there is inevitably room
for over or under-inclusion, at the very least when it comes to human, nondeterministic concepts or ideas such as law. 44 Of course, questions remain as
to whether it is even possible to separate the stages of ascertainment of State
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
40. International Law Association, Preliminary Report of the Study Group on the Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation (Aug. 11, 2016), https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=1401&StorageFileGuid=bcaa951eae3e-4ccb-9c80-248c98c741e3 [hereinafter ILA Study on Interpretation]. See also ROBERT
KOLB, INTERPRÉTATION ET CRÉATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL: ESQUISSES D’UNE
HERMÉNEUTIQUE JURIDIQUE MODERNE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 219–22
(2006); Panos Merkouris, Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation, University of
Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper (last revised July 18, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2749066; Duncan B. Hollis, Sources and Interpretation Theories:
An Interdependent Relationship, Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper (last revised Oct. 8, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2836691.
41. Orfeas Chasapis Tassinis, Customary International Law: Interpretation from Beginning to
End, 31 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 236 (2020).
42. See, e.g., id. at 237, 241.
43. Id. at 242–43.
44. See id. at 244; Matthias Herdegen, Interpretation in International Law, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (last updated Nov. 2020),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e723.
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practice and opinio juris, and the interpretation of an identified rule of custom. 45 As others have noted, even the exercises of selecting, describing, and
evaluating State practice and opinio juris are pervaded by subjectivity and are
thus subject to different interpretations. 46 Either way, it is sensible to assume
that custom or its separate elements are interpretable, 47 that is, that the original, abstract “frame” can always be extended to cover new and more specific
phenomena, like those that implicate digital technologies. For instance, it
could be argued that the rule according to which States must exercise due
diligence and not knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States, spelled out by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Corfu Channel case, 48 is sufficiently general to find application, by
way of interpretation, in the use of ICTs. 49
An alternative way to frame and conceptualize the application of general
rules of customary international law to new types of scenarios is the identification of new customary rules that are specifically tailored to the situation,
context, or domain at hand. This is, according to some scholars, 50 what the
ICJ did with the more general due diligence principle and Albania’s specific
45. See Tassinis, supra note 41, at 246; Hollis, supra note 40, at 2, 4–6, 8; Duncan B.
Hollis, The Existential Function of Interpretation in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015); Jean D’Aspremont, The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 112, 117–18
(Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015).
46. Tassinis, supra note 41, at 257; Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 13, 21 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds.,
2007); Nadia Banteka, A Theory of Constructive Interpretation for Customary International Law Identification, 39 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 301, 316 (2018).
47. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. 3, 181 (Feb. 20) (Tanaka, J., dissenting); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 178 (June 27); Report of the
Panel Appointed by the Director-General of the World Trade Organization to Investigate
Complaints of the United States, Canada, and Argentina: European Communities—
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7.68–7.72, (Nov.
21, 2006), https://www.wto.org/english//tratop_e/dispu_e/291r_3_e.pdf (located at
pages 333–335 of the report).
48. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 839 (Apr. 9).
49. See Antonio Coco & Talita de Souza Dias, “Cyber Due Diligence”: A Patchwork of Protective Obligations in International Law, 32 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 771,
778–83 (2021).
50. See, e.g., Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology
between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
417, 424 (2015); Banteka, supra note 46, at 303, 311–12.
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duty to notify British vessels about mines in the Corfu Channel. 51 This approach seems to have been followed by some States and scholars in relation
to a rule of due diligence in cyberspace: it is often assumed that a new and
cyber-specific rule of due diligence must be specifically identified and applied
to ICTs. 52
However, and crucially, even if one frames the applicability of international law to new domains as custom-identification or ascertainment, there
is usually no need to collate specific instances of State practice and opinio juris
from scratch by induction. This is because whenever a more general rule or
principle of international law already exists whose scope would already cover
a new situation, it is possible to deduce one or more specific rules from the
more general one. 53 As Orfeas Chasapis Tassinis notes, this can be explained
by the nature of customary international law as “an organic body of legal
rules that gradually branches out as opposed to an assemblage of self-standing rules.” 54 Granted, it may not be that every rule of custom is directly rooted
in a pre-existing one. This may be the case of certain rules of procedure, such
as the requirement that instruments of ratification of treaties be exchanged
or deposited with or notified to the other party(ies). 55
Nevertheless, all rules of custom are ultimately grounded or at least informed by foundational international legal principles, such as sovereignty,
51. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
52. See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer
or Crude Destabilizer?, 95 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1555, 1573–74 (2017); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 28, at 45 (referring to the views expressed by some scholars among the Manual’s
international group of experts); Luke Chircop, A Due Diligence Standard of Attribution in Cyberspace, 67 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 643, 660, 662 (2018).
See also Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE LAW JOURNAL
FORUM 68, 73 (2015); Duncan B. Hollis, Improving Transparency—International Law and
State Cyber Operations: Fourth Report to the Organization of American States,
OEA/Ser.Q CJI/doc. 615/20 rev.1, ¶ 7 (Aug. 7, 2020), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/
docs/themes_recently_concluded_International_law_State_cyber_operations_FINAL_
REPORT.pdf (referring generally to the need for evidence of State practice and opinio juris
to assess the applicability of international law in cyberspace) [hereinafter Improving Transparency].
53. Talmon, supra note 50, at 421–23. See also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 757, 758–59 (2001); Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 618, 626 (2003).
54. Tassinis, supra note 41, at 262.
55. VCLT, supra note 39, art. 11.
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consent, and good faith. 56 Although deduction from general rules or principles alone may not always suffice to prove the existence of a more specific
rule of custom, it does raise a strong presumption that such a rule does exist,
in turn lowering the threshold of State practice and opinio juris that would be
necessary to prove its existence. 57 According to Stefan Talmon, in those instances, the outcome of the deductive process is simply confirmed by induction
from a sufficient amount of State practice and opinio juris. 58 If this reasoning
were to be followed in our earlier example, one would conclude that the
general due diligence rule has a more specific counterpart applying mutatis
mutandis to the use of ICTs, as confirmed by relevant State practice and expressions of opinio juris.
In practice, there is little difference between this process of custom-identification and the interpretation and application of general customary rules
to new phenomena. Admittedly, it remains unclear what canons of interpretation should be applied to customary international law, whether reflected in
textual form or drawn from a set of behaviors. 59 But any type of legal interpretation, whether in domestic or international law, can only be informed by
a handful of legal reasoning techniques. As made explicit in the context of
treaty interpretation, these include the ordinary meaning of the words by
which a rule is expressed, its context, its function or objective, and its history
(textual, systematic, teleological, and historical methods of interpretation, respectively). 60 Other methods of interpretation that also apply to written and
unwritten legal rules include analogy, a contrario, in dubio mitis, and other techniques of logical reasoning. 61
That customary international law can be interpreted by these and other
techniques has long been acknowledged before human rights bodies and international criminal courts. 62 These have sought to clarify the extent to which
56. See Banteka, supra note 46, at 316.
57. Talmon, supra note 50, at 427.
58. Id.
59. ILA Study on Interpretation, supra note 40, at 9.
60. VCLT, supra note 39, arts. 31, 32. See also ODILE AMMANN, DOMESTIC COURTS
AND THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW METHODS AND REASONING BASED
ON THE SWISS EXAMPLE, ch. 6 (2019).
61. Mark E. Villiger, The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarriage?
The “Crucible” Intended by the International Law Commission, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION 115, 112 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
62. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 193, 196, 201–
2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002); Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, App.
No. 35343/05, Judgment, ¶¶ 171–86 (2015) (ECtHR).
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more general customary prescriptions or prohibitions apply to specific factual scenarios, often unforeseen at the time the rule was conceived, by using
different interpretative techniques. 63 Notably, in various international courts
and tribunals, as well as diplomatic settings, a key technique to interpret
treaty and customary rules—and trace their evolution over time—is to look
at the subsequent practice of States, which implicitly or explicitly establishes
their agreement. 64 This technique can be used to guide the interpretation of
rules of international law in their application to ICTs, looking at whether
States have considered themselves to be bound by those rules in cyberspace
and other so-called domains.
In short, rules of general international law are not domain-specific, at
least not by default. Instead, the starting point is that they apply across the
board to different matters, contexts, areas, activities, and domains, unless,
and in so far as, their scope is implicitly or explicitly limited to one or more
of these categories. Furthermore, rules or principles that lack such limitations
and thereby are of general applicability can be interpreted and applied to
cover cyberspace.
IV.

IS CYBERSPACE A NEW DOMAIN?

In any event, there are good reasons to challenge the idea that cyberspace is
a new domain requiring domain-specific State practice and opinio juris.
Understanding what cyberspace is requires us to briefly go back to the
origin of the term, its purpose, and the background against which it was
originally employed in legal discourse, before turning to its technical features.
As others have noted, the prefix “cyber” comes from the Greek word kybernetes, which means one who steers or governs, and alludes to the field of
63. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory
Appeal on Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, ¶ 142–78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia Nov. 27, 2002) (finding that the doctrine of command responsibility
under customary international law could be interpreted to apply to both international and
non-international armed conflict, based on the text of relevant legal instruments, their context, and object and purpose).
64. On subsequent practice and customary international law interpretation, see, e.g.,
North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, ¶¶ 44–56,
1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, App. No. 35343/05, Judgment, ¶¶ 176–77
(2015) (ECtHR). On the role of subsequent practice in the context of treaty interpretation,
see VCLT, supra note 39, art. 31(3)(c); International Law Commission, Report on the Work
of the Sixty-Eighth Session, ch. 6, U.N. Doc. A/71/10 (2016) (“Subsequent Agreements
and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties”).
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“cybernetics”—defined as the study of remote control through devices 65 or
“command and control and communications in the animal . . . or the mechanical world.” 66 In contrast, the word “space” not only has physical or
geographical meanings but also philosophical, mathematical, social, and psychological ones. 67 Quite telling but generally overlooked in the literature is
the first use of the term in the 1960s to designate the so-called “Atelier Cyberspace,” an artistic partnership forged between architect Carsten Hoff and
artist Susanne Ussing. 68 Their work comprised a series of visual arts exhibitions containing sensory installations and images that depicted “open systems,” that is, architectural spaces adaptable to various influences, such as
human movement and new material. According to Hoff: “To us, ‘cyberspace’ was simply about managing spaces. There was nothing esoteric about
it. Nothing digital, either. It was just a tool. The space was concrete, physical.” 69
It was only in the 1980s that the term started to be associated with computers and digital networks, following the publication of two works of science fiction by William Gibson, 70 who confessed that “the word ‘cyberspace’
. . . seemed like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and essentially
meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning . . . .” 71
Gibson’s buzzword was subsequently taken up, quite effectively, in the
early days of the Internet by American political activists, such as John Perry
Barlow, and legal theorists, among whom were David Johnson and David
Post. As Julie Cohen notes, this is when the idea of cyberspace as a space
started to take shape. Back then, labeling the Internet and other networks as
another space, different from the “real world,” was an attempt to treat it as a

65. LAURENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 3 (2006).
66. Lior Tabanski, Basic Concepts in Cyber Warfare, 3 MILITARY AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
75, 76 (2011) (citing NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (1955)).
67. Id. at 76.
68. Jacob Lillemose & Mathias Kryger, The (Re)invention of Cyberspace, KUNSTKRITIKK
(Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.kunstkritikk.com/kommentar/the-reinvention-of-cyberspa
ce/.
69. Id.
70. WILLIAM GIBSON, BURNING CHROME (1982); WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER
(1984).
71. NO MAPS FOR THESE TERRITORIES (Docurama 2000) (documentary film featuring
William Gibson).
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separate jurisdiction to which State power, laws, and regulations did not apply. 72
Yet, even in American legal discourse, where the debate about Internet
governance and regulation was most fervent, the idea of an ungovernable or
uncontrollable cyberspace was soon debunked. As early as 1996, in his controversial conference address, Frank Easterbrook immortalized the analogy
according to which the law of cyberspace was as real as the “law of the
horse.” 73 For him, there was neither need nor wisdom to conceive of new
rules for the Internet and other digital networks, as general rules continued
to apply. 74 And in his comprehensive work on “code as law,” Lawrence Lessig notes that, as a human and thus political project, 75 cyberspace “will be
regulated by real space regulation to the extent that it affects real space life,
and it will quite dramatically affect real space life.” 76
In short, cyberspace is nothing but a metaphor to express simulated
spaces or experiences, such as online gaming, dating, or social media; or the
virtual prolongation or manifestation of real spaces, such as shops, public
murals, government institutions, or mailboxes, where the Internet and other
networks serve as tools for the performance of regular, “real world” activities. 77 It is no more real than the worlds or places (re)created by books and
films, or conversations over traditional means of communication, such as
letters or telephone calls. In the same vein, just as global transportation networks do not give rise to a new “world” or “domain,” so does cyberspace
not constitute a new “space.”
This view is corroborated by the more technical definition of the Internet and other networks that are considered to be part of cyberspace. These
are constituted by a range of digital technologies which enable us to communicate and process different types of data or information. And these technologies, such as computer applications, network links, and digital devices,
are themselves made up of complex layers of software, hardware, and the

72. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 210, 216
(2007).
73. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 207, 208 (1996).
74. Id. at 210.
75. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 65, at 85–88.
76. Laurence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1403, 1406
(1996). See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 217–18.
77. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 65, at 9, 83.
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data they process. 78 But as much as software and data—the “virtual” or
“logic” layers of cyberspace—play a significant role in allowing one to control how these technologies operate, the input, processing, and output of
data through code depend on a physical substrate, just like human intelligence and reasoning depends on the human body and brain. Thus, hardware
components such as cables, satellites, radio waves, computers, and millions
of silicon circuits, all located somewhere in the “real world,” are part and
parcel of ICTs or cyberspace. Even if advancements in computer power and
programming languages have greatly improved connectivity and speed
across national boundaries and enhanced our perception of imaginary spaces
such as the World Wide Web, the Cloud, 79 or the Metaverse, 80 these remain
very much grounded in tangible physical infrastructure somewhere in the
world.
However, it would also be too simplistic to stop there and reduce cyberspace, or ICTs, to their physical and logical layers. This is because perhaps
the most important dimension or layer of what we call cyberspace consists
of the human beings and social structures that create, control, and use ICTs,
including their software, hardware, and data. In this sense, cyberspace—or,
more accurately, a multitude of cyberspaces, whether perceived differently
or similarly to other spaces and technologies—is very much a human and
social experience with real-world impact. 81
To give but one example, let us take the SolarWinds hack of late 2020.
This was a malicious cyber operation against a globally supplied network
monitoring software that was carried out by inserting malicious code in the
software’s update system, enabling the hackers to breach the confidentiality
78. On the various layers of cyberspace, see Clare Sullivan, The 2014 Sony Hack and the
Role of International Law, 8 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 437, 454
n.88 (2015).
79. The World Wide Web: A Global Information Space, THE SCIENCE MUSEUM (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/objects-and-stories/world-wide-web-globalinformation-space.
80. Metaverse, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaverse (last visited Feb. 1,
2022).
81. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 65, at 84–85. See also U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra
note 5, ¶ 9 (finding that malicious use of ICT-enable covert information campaigns “pose
direct and indirect harm to individuals”); OEWG Final Substantive Report, supra note 4, ¶¶
4, 19 (noting the need to maintain a “human-centric approach” to ICTs and that unlawful
ICT activity “could pose a threat not only to security but also to State sovereignty, as well
as economic development and livelihoods, and ultimately the safety and wellbeing of individuals”).
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of public and private data. 82 Even assuming that the hack was limited to a
“mere” digital data breach, 83 it led to concrete financial losses and reputational damage to companies, government agencies, and individuals around
the world. 84 This cyber operation also allegedly gave the perpetrators remote
control over certain critical infrastructure systems, at least in the United
States, such as power stations and distribution grids, posing a very real risk
of serious damage to critical public services, such as hospitals and schools. 85
Thus, the term “cyberspace,” with its chiefly virtual connotation, may be
somewhat misleading, as it fails to capture the physical, human, and social
dimensions of ICTs. The term has also been used to purposefully sever these
more tangible dimensions from the software and data layers, and in doing
82. See, e.g., Kate O’Flaherty, SolarWinds: Microsoft Reveals New Details About Sophisticated
Mega-Breach, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2021, 6:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2021/02/16/solarwinds-microsoft-reveals-new-details-about-sophisticated-megabreach/; Kari Paul, SolarWinds Hack was Work of “at least 1,000 engineers”, Tech Executives Tell
Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2021, 7:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/23/solarwinds-hack-senate-hearing-microsoft; Christopher Bing, Suspected
Russian Hackers Spied on U.S. Treasury Emails—Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2020, 1:56 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-treasury-exclsuive/suspected-russian-hackers-spied-on-u-s-treasury-emails-sources-idUKKBN28N0PG?edition-redirect=uk.
83. Jack Goldsmith, Quick Thoughts on the Russian Hack, LAWFARE (Dec. 14, 2020, 11:04
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/quick-thoughts-russia-hack; Kristen Eichensehr,
“Strategic Silence” and State-Sponsored Hacking: The US Gov’t and SolarWinds, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73921/strategic-silence-and-state-sponsored-hacking-the-us-govt-and-solarwinds/; Asaf Lubin, SolarWinds as a Constitutive Moment:
A New Agenda for the International Law of Intelligence, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73989/solarwinds-as-a-constitutive-moment-a-new-agendafor-the-international-law-of-intelligence/; Ciaran Martin, Cyber “Deterrence”: A Brexit Analogy,
LAWFARE (Jan. 15, 2021, 3:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-deterrencebrexit-analogy.
84. Isabella Jibilian & Katie Canales, The US is Readying Sanctions Against Russia Over the
SolarWinds Cyber Attack. Here’s a Simple Explanation of How the Massive SolarWinds Hack Happened and Why it’s Such a Big Deal, BUSINESS INSIDER (updated Apr. 15, 2021, 1:25 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/solarwinds-hack-explained-government-agencies-cybersecurity-2020-12?r=US&IR=T; Kevin Poulsen, Robert McMillan & Dustin Volz, SolarWinds Hack Victims: From Tech Companies to a Hospital and University, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/solarwinds-hack-victimsfrom-tech-companies-to-a-hospital-and-university-11608548402?page=1.
85. Joe Weiss & Bob Hunter, The SolarWinds Hack Can Directly Affect Control Systems,
LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2021, 12:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/solarwinds-hack-candirectly-affect-control-systems; Software Engineering Institute, CERT Coordination Center
Vulnerability Note #843464, SolarWinds Orion API Authentication Bypass Allows Remote Command Execution, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (last revised Jan. 28, 2021),
https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/843464.
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so, to exclude the latter from domestic and international regulation. For
those reasons, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to cyberspace not as a
virtual or separate space, but as a set of multidimensional digital technologies—or ICTs—which are fully integrated with human activities that take
place in different physical domains or “real life” spaces. As States themselves
noted in the 2021 OEWG Final Substantive Report, “the international security dimension of ICTs cuts across multiple domains and disciplines.” 86 After
all, online resources and activities are not an end in themselves, but a means
to achieve different aims or effects that will usually manifest themselves, in
different ways, in one or more of the traditional physical domains.
For present purposes, this means that those technologies remain fully
subject to the rules and principles of international law to the extent that they
are relevant and applicable, and in so far as they have not been carved out
by consistent State practice and opinio juris. 87 Tellingly, that cyberspace is better framed as a set of digital technologies was already reflected in the language used in the various GGE reports, as well as the OEWG’s mandate
and documents, which refer precisely to “information and communication
technologies.” Similar framings, such as cyberspace as a “medium,” 88 or “the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data,” 89 have been adopted by several States. Thus, when it comes to
cyber operations, it is more appropriate to frame questions of applicability
of international law to new technological developments.
V.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IS TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL

If cyberspace is not a separate space or domain, and international law applies
in principle to all domains, are ICTs so different from other technologies
that they are not or cannot be governed by existing international law? In
other words, is there something inherently different about ICTs that carves them
out from existing international law and, in particular, general international
86. OEWG Final Substantive Report, supra note 4, ¶ 10.
87. For a similar point, see Schmitt, supra note 52, at 73; Chircop, supra note 52, at 650.
88. See Brazil, Statement at the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Second Substantive Session on International Law (Feb. 11, 2020), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k18/k18w6jq6eg (comments at timestamp 0:15:45 referring to cyberspace as a “medium” of communications).
89. Definition of Cyberspace, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms 55, (current through Nov. 2021), https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
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law? Alternatively, do technologies whose impact was unforeseen until a few
decades ago fall within the scope of traditional rules and principles of international law, such as sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, nonintervention, and no-harm? Have these continued to stand the test of time?
The answer to these and other similar questions seems to lie in a simple yet
overlooked feature of international law, namely, that it is, by necessity, a
technology-neutral system. 90
Technological—or “tech”—neutrality, in this sense, is not coterminous
with political or economic neutrality in the “tech world.” It is undeniable
that a few major corporations own or control a significant part of the Internet’s logical and physical infrastructure and provide the necessary software
and hardware technologies that keep public and private online communications and information processing going. Thus, there is no neutrality when it
comes to the economic and political forces that shape the use and distribution of ICTs around the world. But international law’s “tech neutrality” is
something else: it refers to the fact that international rules and principles
apply across the board to all technologies, old and new, at least by default
and to the extent relevant.
In international as in domestic law, the fact that human beings have developed new technologies over time, such as trains, cars, telephones, televisions, and mobile phones, has never been reason enough to exclude them
from the scope of application of existing rules or principles, especially those
of general application, such as tort, contract, or criminal law. At the international level, the International Court of Justice recognized as much in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion when it held that:
39. These provisions [Articles 2(4), 42 and 51 of the UN Charter] do
not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the
weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the
use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons. . . .
85. . . . In the view of the vast majority of States as well as writers there
can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons.
90. Second “Pre-draft” of the Report of the OEWG on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security ¶ 21 (May
27, 2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/200527-oewg-ict-revised-pre-draft.pdf [hereinafter Second OEWG Pre-draft]. See also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 28, at 31 (¶ 4), 46 (¶ 12); Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring
Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion of 1 February
2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, at 10, ¶ 117.
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86. The Court shares that view. Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented
after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict
had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 1974–1977 left
these weapons aside, and there is a qualitative as well as quantitative difference
between nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded
from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of
the present and those of the future. 91

Similarly, in its Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities, the International Law Commission noted that
new technologies are also subject to positive duties to prevent transboundary
harm, requiring States to employ scientific and technological developments
to detect, prevent, and redress harm, as well as ensure the safe use of those
technologies:
(11) The standard of due diligence against which the conduct of the
State of origin should be examined is that which is generally considered to
be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary
harm in the particular instance. . . . What would be considered a reasonable
standard of care or due diligence may change with time; what might be considered
an appropriate and reasonable procedure, standard or rule at one point in
time may not be considered as such at some point in the future. Hence, due diligence
in ensuring safety requires a State to keep abreast of technological changes and scientific developments.
...
(14) Article 3 imposes on the State a duty to take all necessary measures
to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the
risk thereof. This could involve, inter alia, taking such measures as are appropriate by way of abundant caution, even if full scientific certainty does not exist,
to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible damage. . . . An efficient implementation of the duty of prevention may well require upgrading the input of

91. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶¶ 39, 85–86 (July 8) (emphasis added).
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technology in the activity as well as the allocation of adequate financial and manpower
resources with necessary training for the management and monitoring of the activity. 92

Even more tellingly, the Chairs’ Summary of discussions held at the UN
OEWG, issued in May 2021 alongside the Group’s Final Substantive Report,
notes that “States emphasized that measures to promote responsible State
behaviour should remain technology-neutral, underscoring that it is the misuse of technologies, not the technologies themselves, that is of concern.” 93
International law’s tech neutrality, in turn, means that existing international law writ large regulates State conduct with respect to ICTs, at least by
default and to the extent relevant. Accordingly, international legal rules or
principles of general applicability—whether these are rules of customary international law, general principles, or generally-framed treaty provisions—apply
to all technologies through which States or non-State entities conduct their relevant activities. Importantly, this starting point means that there is no further
need to prove the applicability of such rules or principles to ICTs or other
technologies via State practice and opinio juris that specifically refer to ICTs.
These rules and principles include the prohibition on the use of force, nonintervention, the Corfu Channel rule of “due diligence,” the no-harm principle,
international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. Their
scope is sufficiently broad to cover ICTs, either via interpretation or deductive reasoning. It is the burden of those advocating for the exclusion of ICTs
from the scope of these rules to present evidence to the contrary. In other
words, they must prove that States, in their general practice accepted as law,
have actively carved out ICTs from the scope of what are otherwise general
rules and principles.
This conclusion does not deny that when applying general rules of existing international law to new technologies some loose ends may need to be
tied and adjusted with best implementation practices. 94 These are necessary
to account for certain specific features of digital technologies, such as their
speed, connectivity, reach, pervasiveness, and transboundary nature. That
notwithstanding—and in line with the views expressed on the issue by an
92. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS FIFTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (July
7, 2001), at 154–55, cmt. to draft art. 3, ¶¶ 11, 14 (emphasis added).
93. Chair’s Summary, supra note 18, ¶ 8 (emphasis added). See also very similar language
in Second OEWG Pre-draft, supra note 90, ¶ 21.
94. Laurence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW 501, 503 (1999).
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overwhelming majority of States—the starting point is the applicability of
existing international law to any technology, rather than a legal vacuum.
As Frank Easterbrook suggests in Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, to
rely on well-established general rules and principles, such as contract, tort,
and property law, that one can apply to cyberspace, as opposed to seeking
specifically tailored cyber law, is not antithetical to good tech-governance. 95
Quite the opposite. As he notes, “the best way to learn the law applicable to
specialized endeavors is to study general rules.” 96 This is not to say that specific rules or regimes are unnecessary or irrelevant. But the point is that specialized regimes for ICTs and other technologies do not necessarily displace
more general rules of international and domestic law. These remain valid, are
applicable, and inform the interpretation of more specific rules for “cyberspace” and beyond. And there is a very good reason for that: in Easterbrook’s words, we lawyers and policy makers “don’t know much about cyberspace; [and] what [we] do know will be outdated in five years (if not five
months!).” 97
In short, the applicability and flexibility of general rules and principles of
international law are all the more important in the context of ICTs and new
technologies, given their rapid development and complexity, which many of
us cannot fully grasp. New, specific, and detailed treaty instruments would
struggle to keep up to speed with the technical and scientific complexity of
new technologies. As a 2020 statement by the Czech Republic summarizes,
in guiding the applicability of international law to ICTs, a “technology-neutral approach . . . provides a safeguard against rapidly evolving nature of ICT
technologies.” 98

95. Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 207–8.
96. Id. at 207.
97. Id. at 208.
98. Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comments Submitted in Reaction to
the Initial “Pre-Draft” Report of the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 2
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/czech-republicoewg-pre-draft-suggestions.pdf.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NONBINDING RECOMMENDATIONS, NORMS, AND PRINCIPLES

As seen earlier, one objection to the applicability of certain general rules of
international law to ICTs is that they have, at times, been framed in normative or hortatory terms in official government statements. Two of these documents—and perhaps the most significant among them—are the 2013 99 and
2015 100 GGE consensus reports, which contain recommendations on
norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior by States in their use of
ICTs, fleshed out in more detail in the 2021 GGE Report. 101 For instance,
the 2013 GGE report makes the following recommendations for States,
some of which seem to mirror existing rules or principles of international
law:
22. States should intensify cooperation against criminal or terrorist use
of ICTs, harmonize legal approaches as appropriate and strengthen practical collaboration between respective law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies.
23. States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. States must not use proxies to
commit internationally wrongful acts. States should seek to ensure that their
territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use of ICTs.
24. States should encourage the private sector and civil society to play
an appropriate role to improve security of and in the use of ICTs, including
supply chain security for ICT products and services.
25. Member States should consider how best to cooperate in implementing the above norms and principles of responsible behaviour, including the role
that may be played by private sector and civil society organizations. 102

More elaborately, the 2015 GGE report contains separate sections on
“How international law applies to the use of ICTs” 103 and “Norms, rules and
principles for the responsible behaviour of States.” 104 In the latter section,

99. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1.
100. U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2.
101. U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶¶ 15–68.
102. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶¶ 22–25 (emphasis added).
103. U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2, ¶¶ 24–29.
104. Id. at ¶¶ 9–15.
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we find an even longer list of recommendations. Like the 2013 GGE recommendations, they also seem to reflect a range of existing international
rules and principles:
(a) Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including to
maintain international peace and security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of
ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or
that may pose threats to international peace and security;
...
(c) States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally
wrongful acts using ICTs;
(d) States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange information,
assist each other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats. States may need
to consider whether new measures need to be developed in this respect;
(e) States, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect Human
Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the promotion, protection
and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as General Assembly resolutions 68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the digital age,
to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of expression;
(f) A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its
obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to
provide services to the public;
(g) States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure
from ICT threats, taking into account General Assembly resolution 58/199
on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of
critical information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions;
...
(k) States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes known as
computer emergency response teams or cybersecurity incident response
teams) of another State. A State should not use authorized emergency response
teams to engage in malicious international activity.105

The fact that both reports distinguish between the application of international law to ICTs and “voluntary, non-binding norms” might at first
glance be taken as an argument that none of the latter “norms” are to be
complied with as a matter of legal obligation. To be sure, some of those
105. Id. at ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
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norms do not reflect binding international law obligations per se. However,
some of them do use, explicitly or implicitly, the language of law, and it is in
those instances that questions arise about the legal status of the provision in
question. Arguments that these “norms” do not reflect international legal
obligations in cyberspace have been made, most notably, with respect to a
rule of due diligence, which, as others have pointed out, 106 seems to be encapsulated in paragraph 13(c) of the 2015 107 report and paragraph 26 of the
2013 report. The UK, for example, has stated that “the fact that States have
referred to this as a non-binding norm indicates that there is not yet State
practice sufficient to establish a specific customary international law rule of
‘due diligence’ applicable to activities in cyberspace.” 108 Similar doubts might
arise with respect to other rules that seem to be reflected in the voluntary,
non-binding norms, such as duties to cooperate with other States in some
circumstances, or the duty not to engage in or support activity contrary to
international law, which seems to be subsumed within the broader rule of
sovereignty.
In this light, one may wonder whether certain well-established rules of
international law have been reduced to non-binding recommendations by
effect of the GGE’s work. Is it possible that, though these rules are generally
applicable, they do not survive as legal obligations in the cyber context because States have chosen to articulate them, in that context, as only voluntary
and non-binding? This argument fails to observe that the articulation of
these norms is without prejudice to States’ rights and obligations under international law. The point has been eloquently raised by Finland during the

106. Schmitt, Grey Zones, supra note 52, at 53–54. See also Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Public Consultation: Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace
in the Context of International Security (June 2020), https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/compilation-norm-implementation-guidance.pdf (submission of Global Partners Digital at the fourth and fifth pages); Johanna Weaver, Submission of Australia’s Independent Expert to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security (May 29,
2020), https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/submission-by-australias-representative-to-the-gge-norm-implementation-may-2020.pdf (noting that “[t]his norm is sometimes
referred to as the ‘due diligence norm’ ”); Republic of Korea, Comments on the Pre-Draft
of the OEWG Report (Apr. 14, 2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/200414-rok-comment-on-pre-draft-of-oewg.pdf.
107. U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2.
108. U.K. Statement, supra note 11, ¶ 12.
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OEWG’s second session, 109 and Japan at the 2021 GGE meeting. 110 Indeed,
paragraph 10 of the 2015 GGE Report makes it clear that these “norms do
not seek to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law.” As aptly noted in the recent OEWG Final Substantive Report:
“norms do not replace or alter States’ obligations or rights under international
law, which are binding, but rather provide additional specific guidance on what
constitutes responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs.” 111
Thus, the mere fact that States have decided, for whatever political or
diplomatic reason, to mirror existing rules of international law in their policy
recommendations cannot deprive those rules of their binding legal force.
Otherwise, recommendations such as the one in paragraph 13(f) of the 2015
GGE Report, establishing that a “State should not conduct or knowingly
support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure,” would become a contradiction in
terms. Likewise, it would make little sense if the recommendation contained
in paragraph 13(k) of the 2015 GGE Report—calling upon States not to
conduct or knowingly support activity harming the information systems of
other States’ emergency response teams and not to use its own emergency
response teams to engage in malicious international activity—were not reflective of an existing obligation under international law. And the recognition, in Norm 13(e), that States should “guarantee full respect for human

109. Janne Taalas, Finland’s Ambassador to the U.N., Statement at the Second Session
of the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (Feb. 10–11, 2020), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Statement-on-International-Law-by-Finnish-Ambassador-Jann
e-Taalas-at-2nd-session-of-OEWG.pdf [hereinafter Finland Statement].
110. Akahori Takeshi, Japan’s Ambassador for United Nations Affairs and Cyber Policy, Statement on the Adoption of the Report by the Sixth GGE on Advancing Responsible
State Behavior in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security (May 28, 2021),
https://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/akahori052821.html (stating that “while some of
the 11 norms are related to international law, they do not alter any rights and obligations
under international law. At the same time, lack of mention in this report does not mean that
international rights and obligations not covered in the document are not applicable in cyberspace.”).
111. OEWG Final Substantive Report, supra note 4, ¶ 25. See also Draft Substantive
Report of the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.290/2021/L.2, ¶ 54 (Jan. 19, 2021), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/389916
8?ln=en.
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rights” online 112 would be hardly reconcilable with the inclusion of “human
rights and fundamental freedoms” as part of the international law applicable
to States’ use of ICTs. 113
This conclusion is also in line with how several States have characterized
the non-binding, voluntary norms of responsible State behavior. First and
foremost, the 2013 GGE Report explicitly notes that the norms are “derived
from existing international law relevant to the use of ICTs by States.” 114 In
the same vein, the 2021 GGE Report recognizes that “[n]orms and existing
international law sit alongside each other,” and that “[n]orms do not seek to
limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law.” 115
France has also made it clear that these norms are an essential part of the
framework of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and thereby are inseparable from the assessment of how binding international law applies in
cyberspace. 116 Germany has also expressed the view that “existing international law, complemented by the voluntary, non-binding norms that reflect
consensus among States, is currently sufficient for addressing State use of

112. U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2, ¶ 13(e); U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note
5, ¶¶ 36–41.
113. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 21; U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra note 2,
¶ 26; U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶ 70.
114. U.N. GGE Report 2013, supra note 1, ¶ 16.
115. U.N. GGE Report 2021, supra note 5, ¶ 15. See also U.N. GGE Report 2015, supra
note 2, ¶ 10.
116. France’s Response to the Pre-Draft Report from the OEWG Chair, https://fro
nt.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/contribution-fr-oewg-eng-vf.pdf (last visited
Jan. 7, 2021) [hereinafter French Response].
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ICTs.” 117 Along similar lines, States such as the UK, 118 France, 119 Poland, 120
Australia, 121 Brazil, 122 and the Dominican Republic, 123 as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross 124 have all affirmed that non-binding
norms are complementary rather than alternative to existing international
law.
117. German Comments on Initial “Pre-draft” of the Report of the OEWG on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and Non-paper Listing Specific Language Proposals Under Agenda Item
“Rules, Norms and Principles” From Written Submissions Received Before 2 March 2020
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/20200401-oewggerman-written-contribution-to-pre-draft-report-1.pdf.
118. James Roscoe, U.K. Representative to the U.N., Statement during U.N. Security
Council Cyber Stability, Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building Meeting (May 22, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K704P5D1n3E#action=share (comments at timestamp 1:13:00); U.K. Government, Press Release, UK Condemns Cyber Actors Seeking to
Benefit from Global Coronavirus Pandemic (May 5, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-cyber-actors-seeking-to-benefit-from-global-coronavirus-pandemic; U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Non-Paper on Efforts to Implement
Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace, as Agreed in U.N. Group of Government Expert Reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015 (Sept. 2019), https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/uk-un-norms-non-paper-oewg-submissionfinal.pdf.
119. French Response, supra note 116.
120. Tadeusz Chomicki, Poland’s Ambassador for Cyber & Tech Affairs, Statement
During Arria-Formula Meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Cyber Stability, Conflict
Prevention and Capacity Building (May 22, 2020), https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/statement_of_poland_arria_un_sc_on_cyber_22.05.2020.pdf.
121. Australia’s Comments on the Initial “Pre-draft” of the Report of the U.N. Open
Ended Working Group in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context
of International Security (Apr. 16, 2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/final-australia-comments-on-oewg-pre-draft-report-16-april.pdf.
122. Ronaldo Costa Filho, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations,
Statement During the Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting “Cyber Stability, Conflict
Prevention and Capacity Building” (May 22, 2020), https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/statement_-_brazil_-_arria_formula_on_cybersecurity_-_final.pdf.
123. José Singer Weisinger, Dominican Republic’s Ambassador and Special Envoy to
the Security Council, Statement During Arria-Formula Meeting of the U.N. Security Council
on Cyber Stability, Conflict Prevention and Capacity Building (May 22, 2020),
https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/Estonia_for_UN/22-5-2020_cyber_stability_and_conflict_prevention_-3.pdf.
124. Véronique Christory, Senior Arms Control Adviser for the International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation to the U.N., Statement to the U.N. Open-ended Working
Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/normsresponsible-state-behavior-cyber-operations-should-build-international-law.
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In sum, the “voluntary, non-binding” norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, as well as similar policy recommendations are neither alternative to, nor do they limit or derogate from, pre-existing binding obligations under international law. On the contrary, norms or recommendations
provide States with much welcome guidance on the interpretation, application, and implementation of their existing international obligations in the
ICT environment. Therefore, although they are not binding per se, these
norms are without prejudice to existing international law. 125 Moreover, they
are not deprived of any legal significance as they lay out possible, timely, and
widely accepted interpretations or understandings as to how existing international law applies to ICTs.
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD FOR CYBER INTERNATIONAL
LAW-MAKING

General rules of international law apply, by definition, to all persons, objects,
events, and technologies that fall within their scope. Although some of these
rules are limited to certain physical or natural spaces, such as air, land, sea,
and outer space, such limitations cannot be presumed, as international law is
not domain-specific. And whether or not such limitations are found, they
cannot, in and of themselves, exclude what we often call “cyberspace.”
For one thing, the concept of “domain” is not exclusionary, but fulfils a
didactic function. For another, cyber is not a space or domain, at least not
like traditional physical spaces. Instead, it is a set of digital technologies,
spread across multiple territorial boundaries and domains, which have been
built by human beings to address different individual, social, political, cultural, and economic needs. Even if their use has led to unique technical advances and human experiences, their impact remains very much grounded in
the real world, ultimately affecting individuals and societies across the globe.
Finally, as is the case with domestic legal systems, international law does not
discriminate on the basis of technology: it applies to each and every tool
employed by States or non-State actors in situations that fall under its extensive scope of application. As such, there is no question that international law
applies to the Internet and other digital information and communications
technologies—in their past, present, and future iterations.

125. See Finland Statement, supra note 109.
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Granted, unlike history, international law can be re-written, provided
that States agree to new rules by treaty or customary international law. However, the law that has been developed so far remains there, until such time
as new rules are developed. General rules and principles of international law
continue to govern State behavior, irrespective of the technologies used.
Should States decide to engage in a law-making effort, either aimed at one
or more new treaties, or at the creation of new rules of customary international law through general practice accepted as law, they must be aware that
they are not building on a legal vacuum, but on the foundations of a wealth
of existing, binding rules. These rules have not only been affirmed but continue to be overwhelmingly applied and respected by the vast majority of
States in the ICT environment, whether they expressly admit it or not.
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